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On March 19, 2013, a patient from United Arab Emir-
ates who had severe respiratory infection was transferred 
to a hospital in Germany, 11 days after symptom onset. In-
fection with Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus 
(MERS-CoV) was suspected on March 21 and confirmed 
on March 23; the patient, who had contact with an ill camel 
shortly before symptom onset, died on March 26. A contact 
investigation was initiated to identify possible person-to-per-
son transmission and assess infection control measures. Of 
83 identified contacts, 81 were available for follow-up. Ten 
contacts experienced mild symptoms, but test results for re-
spiratory and serum samples were negative for MERS-CoV. 
Serologic testing was done for 53 (75%) of 71 nonsymp-
tomatic contacts; all results were negative. Among contacts, 
the use of FFP2/FFP3 face masks during aerosol exposure 
was more frequent after MERS-CoV infection was suspect-
ed than before. Infection control measures may have pre-
vented nosocomial transmission of the virus.
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection was initially reported to the World 
Health Organization (WHO) in September 2012 (1,2). By 
November 11, 2013, a total of 153 laboratory-confirmed 
cases of human infection with MERS-CoV had been identi-
fied; 64 (42%) of those with confirmed cases had died (3). 
Most (63%) case-patients had severe respiratory disease; 
76% also had >1 underlying chronic condition (4). The me-
dian age of case-patients was 50 years (range 14 months 
to 94 years). All cases were directly or indirectly related to 
countries in the Middle East or on the Arabian Peninsula.
MERS-CoV shows a close genetic relationship with 
coronaviruses found in bats (1,5–10), but no zoonotic link 
has been confirmed. Person-to-person transmission has 
been reported in the work environment, among family 
contacts, or to health care workers (HCWs) (11–13). Al-
though situations involving consecutive human transmis-
sion events have been documented (13), none of the known 
clusters have led to sustained person-to-person transmis-
sion in the general population. In Europe, single imported 
infections have been reported in the United Kingdom, Ger-
many, France, and Italy, and secondary cases have been re-
ported in the United Kingdom, France, and Italy (12,14,15). 
Because a large proportion of cases are fatal and the virus 
could acquire the ability to spread more efficiently (as was 
the case with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavi-
rus), WHO has recommended thorough contact investiga-
tions for confirmed human cases to identify, quantify, and 
prevent person-to-person transmission (16).
In Germany, MERS-CoV infection was initially re-
ported in a person from Qatar (17). He was in his third week 
of illness and was already on mechanical ventilation when 
he was admitted to a hospital in Essen in October 2012. A 
retrospective contact investigation found no indication of 
person-to-person transmission to contacts in Germany (17).
On March 23, 2013, the Institute for Virology of 
the University of Bonn reported an imported case of 
MERS-CoV infection to the Department of Health and 
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Environment in Munich (City Health Department). A 
73-year-old man from Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, 
had been admitted to a hospital in Munich and had posi-
tive test results for MERS-CoV infection (Figure 1). Clin-
ical details and virologic findings have been reported else-
where (18). Briefly, the patient had underlying multiple 
myeloma and had received several modes of treatment, 
including high-dose chemotherapy and autologous stem-
cell transplantation in 2009. On March 8, 2013, influenza-
like illness with fever and cough developed in the patient. 
After his symptoms worsened, he was hospitalized in his 
country on March 10 with a diagnosis of pneumonia; he 
was intubated on March 17 and transferred by flight am-
bulance services to Germany on March 19, eleven days 
after illness onset, for further intensive care treatment and 
mechanical ventilation.
General infection control guidelines of the Munich 
hospital required that patients from areas such as the Mid-
dle East, where prevalence of multidrug-resistant patho-
gens is high, be isolated until colonization or infection with 
a multidrug-resistant pathogen is ruled out. This rule is 
particularly enforced when patients have been previously 
hospitalized in the country of origin. Thus, at the time of 
hospital admission in Germany, the patient was isolated 
from other patients. When MERS-CoV infection was sus-
pected and included in the differential diagnosis on March 
21, standard hygiene measures for HCWs were changed 
to infection control measures as recommended for severe 
acute respiratory syndrome patients, including the use of 
FFP2 face masks for usual patient care (19).
MERS-CoV infection was diagnosed in the patient on 
March 23; he died on March 26 of multiorgan failure and 
acute respiratory distress syndrome. After MERS-CoV 
infection was diagnosed, the City Health Department, in 
cooperation with the state health department, the Institute 
for Virology in Bonn, and the Robert Koch Institute, ini-
tiated an investigation to 1) monitor all contacts of the 
patient to identify possible person-to-person transmis-
sion, 2) assess infection control measures, and 3) explore 




For the investigation, the City Health Department as-
sessed all contact persons (contacts) retrospectively and 
monitored them prospectively. All contacts received a ques-
tionnaire for retrospective documentation and prospective 
daily self-monitoring of symptoms, exposure to the patient, 
and infection control measures applied. For every day from 
March 19 through April 5, information was collected about 
the contacts’ distance from the patient (<2 meters vs. >2 
meters); type of contact with the patient (aerosol-produc-
ing procedures, non–aerosol-producing procedures, care 
of patient, handling of urine catheter, handling of respira-
tory samples in the laboratory, handling of urine samples 
in the laboratory); type of protection used (surgical mask, 
FFP1 mask, FFP2 mask, FFP3 mask, gown, gloves, protec-
tive glasses); and symptoms experienced by the contacts 
(cough, fever, temperature, sore throat, diarrhea, shortness 
of breath). An aerosol-producing procedure was defined as 
respiratory suction, bronchoalveolar lavage, intubation, or 
bronchoscopy.
On the basis of the self-reported information in the 
questionnaires and personal interviews with the contacts, 
we divided contacts into 2 groups. Close-distance contacts 
had face-to-face contact with the patient (<2 meters from 
the patient) or direct contact with secretions or body fluids 
of the patient, irrespective of protective measures worn. All 
other contacts were classified as less-close-distance con-
tacts. According to WHO recommendations on the dura-
tion of follow-up at that time, close-distance contacts were 
asked to contact the City Health Department daily for 10 
days after the last exposure to the patient. Those who failed 
to do so were contacted by the City Health Department, 
supported by the occupational health service of the hospi-
tal. Less-close-distance contacts were asked to report to the 
City Health Department only in case of onset of symptoms.
Respiratory illnesses in contacts that occurred 1–10 
days after exposure to the patient were assessed through the 
City Health Department by telephone contact with the con-
tact; a respiratory tract sample was taken from any contact 
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Figure 1. Timeline for patient history and contact investigation in imported case of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), Germany, 2013.
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with respiratory illness. In addition, attempts were made to 
obtain paired serologic samples from all contacts, the first 
taken immediately after contact and the second >28 days 
after the last exposure.
Patient Questionnaire
Because the MERS-CoV patient was on mechanical 
ventilation and could not be interviewed, family contacts 
who had accompanied him to Germany were interviewed 
about the onset of his symptoms and possible exposures in 
the 10 days before disease onset. For the interview, a struc-
tured questionnaire was used, and information collected 
was documented on paper.
Laboratory Methods
PCR testing and serologic testing were done as de-
scribed (17,20). Serum samples from contacts were tested 
for MERS-CoV antibodies if a serum sample was taken 
>28 days after last exposure. In addition, serum samples 
were tested for antibodies against influenza A, B, and C; 
rhinovirus A, B, and C; parainfluenzavirus 1, 2, 3, and 4; 
respiratory syncytial virus A and B; human metapneumo-
virus; coronavirus 229E, NL63, OC43, and HKU1; and 
adenovirus. All samples were analyzed at the Institute for 
Virology of the University of Bonn.
Data Analysis
Data from the City Health Department’s contact moni-
toring, the contacts’ questionnaires, and the laboratory 
findings were integrated in 1 database. Results were vali-
dated and analyzed by using Stata version 12.0 (StataCorp, 
College Station, TX, USA).
Results
Contact Investigation
The City Health Department identified 83 contacts. Of 
these, 69 (83%) were classified as close-distance contacts 
and 14 (17%) as less-close-distance contacts (Table). Four 
(5%) of the contacts were members of the patient’s family, 
16 (19%) were physicians, 25 (30%) were nursing staff, 20 
(24%) were laboratory personnel, and 18 (22%) were part 
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No. (%) close-distance 
contacts, n = 69‡ 
No. (%) less-close- 
distance contacts, n = 14‡ p value§ 
Contacts, n = 83    0.103 
 Physicians 16 (19) 11 (69) 5 (31)  
 Nursing staff 25 (30) 24 (1) 1 (4)  
 Laboratory personnel 20 (24) 17 (85) 3 (15)  
 Family members 4 (5) 4 (100) 0  
 Other 18 (22) 13 (72) 5 (28)  
Response to questionnaire 61 (73) 55 (90) 6 (10) 0.004 
Aerosol exposure 15 (18) 15 (100) 0 0.054 
Symptoms    0.006 
 Symptomatic 10 (12) 9 (90) 1 (10)  
 Nonsymptomatic¶ 71 (86) 60 (85) 11 (15)  
 Unknown 2 (2) 0 2 (100)  
Swab samples, symptomatic contacts, n = 10    0.725 
 Swab sample collected 9 (90) 8 (89) 1 (11)  
 No swab sample collected 1 (10) 1 (100) 0  
PCR results for symptomatic contacts with swab samples, n = 9   NA 
 MERS-CoV positive  0 NA NA  
 MERS-CoV negative  9 (100) 8 (89) 1 (11)  
 HCoV-NL63 positive  1 (11) 1 (100) 0  
 Rhinovirus positive  2 (22) 2 (100) 0  
Serologic test results    0.007 
 MERS-CoV positive 0 NA NA  
 MERS-CoV negative 60 (72) 54 (90) 6 (10)  
 Not done 23 (28) 15 (65) 8 (35)  
Serologic testing among symptomatic contacts, n = 10    0.107 
 MERS-CoV positive  0 NA NA  
 MERS-CoV negative 7 (70) 7 (100) 0  
 Not done 3 (30) 2 (67) 1 (33)  
Serologic testing among nonsymptomatic¶ contacts, n = 71   0.095 
 MERS-CoV positive 0 NA NA  
 MERS-CoV negative 53 (75) 47 (89) 6 (11)  
 Not done 18 (25) 13 (72) 5 (28)  
*Definitions of close-distance and less-close-distance contacts provided in article text. MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus; NA, not 
applicable. 
†Percentages are of contacts (N = 83) unless otherwise indicated. 
‡Percentages are of category total. 
§Probability that the distribution as indicated occurs by chance given the column and row totals. 
¶Nonsymptomatic contacts are asymptomatic persons and those who were symptomatic before exposure. 
 
Imported Case of MERS, Germany
of other professional groups. Clinical follow-up was avail-
able for 81 (98%) contacts.
A respiratory symptom or fever developed in 10 (12%) 
contacts. Of these, swab specimens were collected from 9 
(90%) and blood samples from 7 (70%). All 9 swab speci-
mens were negative for MERS-CoV; 1 (11%) was positive 
for CoV NL-63, and 2 (22%) were positive for rhinovirus. 
All 7 serum samples were negative for MERS-CoV anti-
bodies. All symptomatic contacts had >1 sample type (re-
spiratory swab or serum) collected for laboratory testing; 
results of PCR and serologic testing were available from 6 
(60%), PCR only from 3 (30%), and serologic testing only 
from 1 (10%). In addition, serologic test results were avail-
able for 53 (75%) of the 71 nonsymptomatic contacts; all 
were negative for MERS-CoV antibodies. Overall, persons 
for whom serologic testing results were available were 
more likely to be close-distance contacts than were persons 
without available serologic results (p = 0.007; Table).
The 4 family members who accompanied the patient 
were his wife, daughter, son, and son-in-law. Their ages 
were 35–37 years, and none reported symptoms. The pa-
tient’s children and son-in-law had their last contact with 
the patient on March 20 and his wife on March 23. Because 
no protection measures had been used until after March 20, 
the family members were considered at high risk  for infec-
tion. All 4 provided respiratory swab and serum samples on 
March 24; all samples had negative results. Serum samples 
taken >28 days after last exposure to the patient were not 
available.
MERS-CoV infection was added to the differential di-
agnosis for the patient on March 21. The daily numbers of 
HCWs who had any contact with him (regardless of protec-
tion measures) and of those who had aerosol exposure were 
lower after that date than before (Figure 2): 4.4 HCW per 
illness day vs. 7.5 HCW per illness day (p = 0.05) and 2.8 
HCW per illness day vs. 6 HCW per illness day (p = 0.03). 
Among HCWs with aerosol exposure, 1 (8%) of 12 daily 
exposures occurred while FFP2 or FFP3 masks were being 
used before March 21; after that date, 11 (79%) of 14 daily 
exposures occurred while FFP2 or FFP3 masks were being 
used (p<0.01).
Patient Questionnaire
The patient was a 73-year-old married man from Abu 
Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; he had a medical history of 
multiple myeloma. At the time of his MERS-CoV infec-
tion, he was receiving corticosteroid therapy. His profes-
sion was camel breeding; in the 2 weeks before his onset of 
illness, 1 of his camels was reported to have had a respira-
tory illness. In the questionnaire, we did not differentiate 
between dromedary (Camelus dromedaries) and Bactrian 
(C. bactrianus) camels. His neighborhood had palm trees, 
and bats were known to dwell in the area. The patient had 
no known contact with other MERS-CoV patients, had 
no personal contacts in Qatar or Jordan, and had no travel 
history in the 10 days before illness onset. He consumed 
different types of fruit juices and cooked goat meat, beef, 
and sheep meat, but no raw meat. He ate dates from his re-
gion, but he reportedly did not consume date or palm syrup. 
Other than the camels on his farm, he had no contact with 
animals; he did not practice falconry and did not visit camel 
racetracks or animal markets.
Discussion
We describe the case and contact investigation of a 
confirmed case of MERS-CoV infection that was imported 
to Germany. We did not identify person-to-person trans-
mission from the patient to any of the contacts. As with 
the previous imported case in this country, the patient was 
already on mechanical ventilation when he was transferred 
to Germany. However, whereas the previous case was in 
the late third week of illness, this patient was in the second 
week of illness. Sample from this patient taken from dif-
ferent body locations and at different times were positive 
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Figure 2. Daily number of health 
care workers who had contact 
with a patient infected with Middle 
East respiratory syndrome 
(MERS) coronavirus who was 
hospitalized in Germany, March 
19–26, 2013.
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for MERS-CoV by PCR, and the viral load detected was 
several logs higher than in samples from the patient with 
the previous imported case (18,20). These results indicate 
that this patient may have been more infectious than the 
previous patient. 
Nosocomial transmission from MERS patients to 
HCWs has been documented (13,21,22). In our study, the 
patient was isolated during the first 2 days of his hospital 
stay (before MERS was suspected), although the reason 
for this intervention was the hospital’s policy to isolate 
every patient from the Middle East, irrespective of the as-
sumed diagnosis, because of perceived increased risk of 
carrying drug-resistant pathogens, rather than any special 
measures taken because of the patient’s respiratory illness. 
After MERS was suspected, HCWs used FFP2 masks sig-
nificantly more frequently than they had before, and fewer 
HCWs had daily contact with the patient. Our result sug-
gest that, in the later stages of this disease, the combination 
of standard protection measures (use of surgical masks for 
potentially aerosol-generating procedures), cautious han-
dling of the patient (because of his potential to harbor drug-
resistant bacteria), and possible decreased infectiousness 
compared with the first week of illness may have prevented 
transmission to HCWs. These findings also underline the 
importance of following WHO recommendations on infec-
tion prevention and control when managing a patient who 
may be infected with a pathogen that could lead to nosoco-
mial transmission (23).
Regarding possible sources of infection, an extensive 
interview was conducted with family members because the 
patient could not be interviewed. The patient’s illness was 
likely a primary case, and possible exposures that might 
have caused the MERS-CoV infection were explored. Of 
note were the presence of bats in the neighborhood of his 
residence, the patient’s profession as camel breeder, and 
his contact with a camel that was reported to have had a 
respiratory illness before his own illness onset. Bats are a 
likely reservoir for MERS-related CoV (5,8), and serum 
samples from Omani racing camels have shown to have 
neutralizing antibodies against MERS-CoV (24). These 
findings suggest these animals’ possible relevance (e.g., as 
intermediate hosts) for human acquisition of MERS-CoV.
Two complementary monitoring instruments for contact 
persons were used: active follow-up with daily telephone 
contact and a self-administered monitoring questionnaire. 
Both methods have merits, and a combination of both is like-
ly to ensure the most thorough contact follow-up. Advan-
tages of personal interviews on the telephone are immediacy 
and the possibility for the interviewer to receive intangible 
information, such as the self-assessment of symptoms, as 
well as the opportunity to answer questions from the con-
tacts. This process enables a more specific way to judge a 
person’s health status. On the other hand, a daily monitoring 
questionnaire provides detail in clinical information, expo-
sure, and protection measures that might be used for more 
in-depth analyses (e.g., when a few contacts have become 
infected). Such a questionnaire could be expanded to include 
a section for contact persons to fill in the names of persons 
with whom they had face-to-face contact during each day. 
This information might become crucial for second-gener-
ation contact tracing when contacts under observation be-
come infected. Rapid availability of this type of information 
is essential for efficient investigation of clusters or outbreaks 
similar to those that have been reported already (13).
In conclusion, we conducted a contact investigation 
of an imported case of MERS-CoV infection in Germany. 
Laboratory testing of symptomatic and asymptomatic con-
tacts of the index case-patient did not indicate transmis-
sion of the virus. Furthermore, we documented the change 
from standard hygiene to infection control measures after 
MERS-CoV was suspected, an adaptation that may have 
prevented nosocomial transmission. Exposure to camels as 
a possible etiologic mechanism for human MERS-CoV in-
fection requires further evidence from other studies.
Dr Reuss is an epidemiologist at the Respiratory Infections 
Unit, Robert Koch Institute, Berlin, Germany. Her research inter-
ests include emerging infectious respiratory diseases, pandemic 
preparedness, and influenza vaccination.
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